Unconditionally Secure Commitment of a Certified Classical Bit is
  Impossible by Kent, Adrian
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
99
10
08
7v
2 
 3
 N
ov
 1
99
9
DAMTP-1999-51
quant-ph/9910087
Unconditionally Secure Commitment of a Certified Classical Bit is Impossible
Adrian Kent
Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Cambridge,
Silver Street, Cambridge CB3 9EW, U.K.
(October 20, 1999)
In a secure bit commitment protocol involving only classical physics, A commits either a 0
or a 1 to B. If quantum information is used in the protocol, A may be able to commit a state
of the form α|0〉 + β|1〉. If so, she can also commit mixed states in which the committed bit is
entangled with other quantum states under her control. We introduce here a quantum cryptographic
primitive, bit commitment with a certificate of classicality (BCCC), which differs from standard bit
commitment in that it guarantees that the committed state has a fixed classical value. We show that
no unconditionally secure BCCC protocol based on special relativity and quantum theory exists.
We also propose complete definitions of security for quantum and relativistic bit commitment.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
The discovery of secure quantum key distribution [1]
and other applications of quantum information raises
the question: which cryptographic tasks can be guaran-
teed secure by physical principles? One task which has
been extensively investigated is bit commitment(BC), an
important cryptographic primitive with several applica-
tions. In this note, we distinguish between standard bit
commitment and a stronger task, bit commitment with a
certificate of classicality. We show that, while the former
can be guaranteed secure by physical principles, the lat-
ter cannot. We also propose complete definitions of var-
ious types of physical security for bit commitment and
related tasks.
II. PHYSICAL SECURITY
In the most commonly considered cryptographic sce-
nario, A and B each occupy disjoint laboratories which
are treated as effectively pointlike. Each trusts the in-
tegrity of their own laboratory but nothing outside; in
particular, neither trusts the other to accurately declare
their location. Under these assumptions, special rela-
tivistic signalling constraints cannot be relied on for se-
curity, and the parties are effectively restricted to pro-
tocols involving sequentially exchanged messages, each
party waiting to receive one message before sending the
next.
Special relativistic signalling constraints can, though,
play a valuable roˆle in ensuring security in cryptographic
scenarios in which each party controls laboratories in two
separate locations [12]. While these laboratories must be
near to mutually agreed coordinates, this can be tested
within a given protocol: no trust between the parties is
required.
We will neglect the possibility of cryptographic proto-
cols whose security relies on general relativity, on quan-
tum field theory as opposed to quantum mechanics, on
the details of the standard model, and so on. Similarly,
we neglect the possibility of physically based attacks rely-
ing on properties of these theories. No practical protocols
or attacks of these types have so far been suggested.
So far as physical security is concerned, then, cryp-
tographic tasks can presently be classified according to
whether they can be securely implemented by using clas-
sical information and relying on special relativity, by us-
ing quantum information and neglecting special relativ-
ity, or by relying both on the properties of quantum infor-
mation and on special relativity, or whether they cannot
be securely implemented at all. We can divide crypto-
graphic protocols into the following classes. A classical
protocol relies on the exchange of classical information,
while a quantum protocol allows quantum information
exchange. In a non-relativistic protocol, the signalling
constraints imposed by special relativity are neglected,
usually because they make no essential difference to the
protocol’s security. In a relativistic protocol, special rel-
ativity is taken as the underlying theory, and the parties
are located so that relativistic signalling constraints play
a crucial role by ensuring that some communications be-
tween them are generated independently.
Similarly, a classical attack on a protocol is a cheating
attempt by one party which involves diverging from the
defined protocol and which can be described by standard
non-relativistic or special relativistic classical physics —
i.e. without using quantum information. A quantum at-
tack involves the transmission and/or manipulation of
quantum information.
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III. BIT COMMITMENT: DEFINITIONS AND
RESULTS
We now recall the definitions of secure bit commitment
in classical cryptology. In a classical BC protocol A and
B exchange classical data in such a way that B obtains an
encoding of a bit from A. A need not necessarily know
which bit she has encoded: she could build a random
bit generator and encoder and not inspect its operations.
But if she follows the protocol, either 0 or 1 is committed,
even if she does not know which. For the protocol to be
classically perfectly secure against B, it must guarantee to
A that B cannot gain any information about a committed
bit until A chooses to reveal it. For it to be classically
perfectly secure against A, it must guarantee to B that
a committed bit is genuinely fixed between commitment
and revelation. That is, there must not be a cheating
method allowing A any chance of revealing the opposite
bit to that committed. More precisely (since A might
have sent nonsense), perfect security requires that unless
A committed a bit a via the protocol, her probability of
later revealing a should be zero.
A security parameter in a BC protocol is a positive in-
teger parameter, N , such that security can be increased
by increasing N . The protocol is classically secure mod-
ulo certain assumptions if, when the assumptions hold,
the probability of A successfully cheating by classical at-
tacks and the information available to B about the bit
before revelation can simultaneously be made arbitrarily
small by taking N sufficiently large It is unconditionally
classically secure if its security is guaranteed if classical
physics (in the case of relativistic protocols, special rela-
tivistic classical physics) is valid.
In a quantum BC protocol, it may be possible for A to
commit a bit in an improper mixed state α|0〉〈0|+β|1〉〈1|,
by entangling the committed state with another state
kept under her control. She can do this, for example,
by building a quantum computer which is programmed
to follow the protocol for either of the orthogonal in-
put states |0〉 or |1〉 and inputting a superposition. If
she does so after entangling a second system | 〉A with
the input bit, by preparing α|0〉|0〉A + β|1〉|1〉A, she can
keep this second system under her control throughout the
commitment, carry out a measurement of the observable
with eigenbasis |0〉A, |1〉A just before revelation, and then
reveal either a 0 or a 1 to B depending on the measure-
ment result. This possibility, whose security implications
were first pointed out and investigated by Brassard et al.
[11], is not considered a security failure of a quantum
BC protocol per se, although it can open up new cheat-
ing possibilities for A if the protocol is part of a larger
cryptographic scheme.
So, we need revised definitions of security for quan-
tum bit commitment. Complete definitions of security
for non-relativistic quantum BC does not seem to have
been set out yet, no doubt partly because it is known
[6,7,10,5,8] that, under any reasonable definition, un-
conditional security is unattainable for non-relativistic
quantum BC protocols. However, precise definitions
are needed to discuss security based on computational
bounds for quantum BC and to discuss the security of
relativistic quantum BC protocols. We propose defini-
tions of security for non-relativistic quantum BC below,
and extend them to the relativistic case.
For a non-relativistic quantum BC protocol to be per-
fectly secure against B, it must guarantee to A that B
can obtain no information about a committed bit until A
chooses to reveal it. For it to be perfectly secure against
A, it must guarantee to B that A cannot act between
commitment and revelation so as ever to obtain some
chance of choosing between revealing 0 and 1. More pre-
cisely, define p0(t) be the probability of A revealing to B
a 0 without giving him evidence that she has violated the
protocol, assuming that from time t onward she follows a
strategy that maximizes her chances of doing so. Define
p1(t) similarly. Let p(t) = p0(t) + p1(t). Assume that B
knows the commitment phase has ended at t = 0. Then
B must be guaranteed that, however A acts after t = 0,
it must always be the case that p(t) ≤ 1 for all t > 0.
A security parameter for a quantum BC protocol is a
variable positive integer parameter, N , such that security
can be increased by increasing N . More precisely, we say
a non-relativistic quantum BC protocol is secure modulo
certain assumptions if, when the relevant assumptions
hold:
(i) A is guaranteed that the information available to B
during the protocol about the bit to be revealed can be
bounded by ǫ.
(ii) B is guaranteed that, for every possible strategy
of A’s, the a priori probability of her making p(t) > 1,
for any t > 0, is uniformly bounded, whenever B is per-
suaded at t = 0 that A has followed the commitment
phase of the protocol. I.e., for any ǫ′ > 0, there is an ǫ′′
such that, regardless of the A’s strategy,
Prob
(
supt≥0(p(t)) > 1 + ǫ
′
)
< ǫ′′ .
(iii) For any ǫ′ > 0, ǫ and ǫ′′ can simultaneously be
made arbitrarily small by increasing the security param-
eter.
A non-relativistic quantum BC protocol is uncon-
ditionally secure if its security is guaranteed if non-
relativistic quantum mechanics is valid.
For relativistic quantum BC protocols, we use simi-
lar definitions. There must be some spacetime point P
at which B is persuaded that A is committed. For any
space-time point Q, let PC(Q) be the past light-cone of
Q and P¯C(Q) be the rest of spacetime. We now define
p0(Q) to be the probability of A revealing to B a 0 with-
out giving him any evidence that she has violated the
protocol, assuming that in P¯C(Q) she follows a strat-
egy that maximizes her chances of doing so, and p1(Q)
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similarly, and set p(Q) = p0(Q) + p1(Q). For perfect
security we then require that, if B is persuaded of a com-
mitment at P , then however A acts in P¯C(P ), we must
have p(Q) ≤ 1 for all Q in P¯C(P ). The definitions of
security modulo assumptions are modified similarly. A
relativistic quantum BC protocol is unconditionally se-
cure if its security is guaranteed if quantum mechanics
and special relativity are valid.
All non-relativistic classical BC schemes are in prin-
ciple insecure, though very good practical security can
presently be attained. Several quantum BC schemes have
been proposed [2–4]. Again, for practical purposes, these
schemes generally offer very good security at present.
However, in principle they are insecure. More generally,
it was shown independently by Lo and Chau [5,8] and
by Mayers [6,7,10] that no non-relativistic quantum BC
schemes can be perfectly secure against both Bob and Al-
ice. The restriction to non-relativistic schemes, though
not made clear in the cited papers, is crucial.
The Lo-Chau-Mayers result was extended by Mayers
[6,7,10] to give a proof of the general impossibility of un-
conditionally secure quantum bit commitment. Again,
it should be noted that, despite initial suggestions to the
contrary [6], Mayers’ proof applies only to non-relativistic
schemes [12,13]. We refer here to the result that uncondi-
tionally secure non-relativistic quantum bit commitment
is impossible as the NRQBC no-go theorem.
More recently, several relativistic classical BC proto-
cols have been proposed [12,13]. These schemes are evi-
dently secure against classical attacks and are all conjec-
tured to be secure against quantum attacks. Though the
first protocol proposed [12] requires an exponentially in-
creasing communication rate for its implementation, the
later protocols [13] can be implemented indefinitely over
communication channels of fixed capacity. No sharp op-
timality results are known; further refinements can un-
doubtedly be made. Our aim here, though, is not to
examine the situation regarding BC protocols in more
detail, but to consider BCCC protocols.
IV. BIT COMMITMENT WITH A CERTIFICATE
OF CLASSICALITY
For many purposes, it would be desirable to have a
BC protocol which is guaranteed to behave like a classi-
cal protocol, preventing A from exploiting the dangerous
possibility [11] of committing a bit state which remains
entangled. Formally, we define bit commitment with a
certificate of classicality (BCCC) to be a bit commitment
in which the revelation of a bit a guarantees that this
particular bit was originally committed by A. This does
not necessarily imply that A was aware of the value of a.
As with ordinary BC, she could arrange to remain igno-
rant, for instance by using a classical randomising device
to prepare a proper mixed state and not inspecting the
device.
We say a BCCC protocol is perfectly secure against B
if it guarantees to A that B can obtain no information
about the committed bit until A chooses to reveal it.
We say it is perfectly secure against A, if a revelation by
A guarantees to B that the revealed bit was previously
committed: i.e., by some point in the protocol, a valid
commitment by A corresponds to her having input one
of the states |0〉, |1〉 into some device which generates her
transmissions to B during the remainder of the protocol,
and a valid revelation of a guarantees to B that (pre-
cisely) the state |a〉 was input at that point. As in the
case of BC protocols, it must be possible to continue the
commitment for arbitrarily long between this point and
the moment of revelation.
A security parameterN for a BCCC protocol is defined
essentially as for a BC protocol. Thus, we say a BCCC
protocol is secure modulo certain assumptions if, when
the assumptions hold, a revelation of a guarantees that,
with probability 1 − ǫ, the fidelity of A’s input state to
the state |a〉 differed from 1 by no more than ǫ′, while the
information available to B about the bit during the proto-
col is no more than ǫ′′, where ǫ, ǫ′, ǫ′′ can simultaneously
be made arbitrarily small by taking N sufficiently large.
A non-relativistic BCCC protocol is unconditionally se-
cure if its security is guaranteed if quantum mechanics
is valid. A relativistic BCCC protocol is unconditionally
secure if its security is guaranteed if quantum mechanics
and special relativity are valid.
V. UNCONDITIONALLY SECURE BCCC IS
IMPOSSIBLE
The main point of this paper is to show that no un-
conditionally secure BCCC protocol, relativistic or other-
wise, exists. We first give the proof, and then comment.
It is enough to show that no unconditionally secure
relativistic protocol exists. We prove this by contradic-
tion. Suppose that some unconditionally secure BCCC
protocol existed. Such a protocol might require A and
B to occupy many sites, say A1, ...., Am and B1, ...., Bn.
Their locations may be time-dependent, provided that
the relevant worldlines are timelike and that A and B’s
sites are always disjoint. We add a further constant ve-
locity site B0 for B, and use its stationary frame to define
the time coordinate. Now suppose that A and B agree a
large number M , a much larger number N0 >> M , and
a large value N1 for the security parameter. They also fix
times of transmissions between their sites so as to run si-
multaneously 2N0 BCCC protocols. A chosen randomly
and independently 2N0 bits, and commits those bits to
B in the BCCC protocols.
Regardless of the relative separations of the sites, B can
establish some time tc after the start of the protocols at
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which B0 knows that, if A has followed the BCCC proto-
cols correctly, she is now committed (to the extent that
the security parameter prescribes). A is then required to
send B0, after time tc, a sequence of N0 spin 1/2 particles
in one of the four spin states | ↑〉, | ↓〉, | ←〉, | →〉. (The
first two are eigenstates of σz; the last two of σx.) This
sequence is supposed to be correlated with the sequence
of N0 pairs of BCCC protocols given by the first two, the
second two, and so on. In each case, if the committed
bits are respectively (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), the state
sent is supposed to be | ↑〉, | ↓〉, | ←〉, | →〉.
Once B0 has received and stored the N0 states, he ran-
domly picks (N0 −M) of them, and sends a message to
A asking her to reveal the corresponding commitments.
Some time tr > tc is fixed such that the revealed bits are
communicated back to B0 from the Bi by time tr. B0
then checks that the revealed bits do indeed characterise
the spin-1/2 particle states, by carrying out measure-
ments in the appropriate basis for each of the (N0 −M)
particles. If the tested particles pass these checks, B ac-
cepts that the remaining M particles are also (to very
good approximation) in pure, unentangled eigenstates of
σx or σz . The corresponding 2M BCCC protocols play
no further roˆle, and are now suspended, without A re-
vealing the corresponding bits to B.
A can now commit a single bit a to B via the following
BC protocol. Each of the M untested spin-1/2 particles
is (to good approximation) in a σz or σx eigenstate. Each
of these states is known to A but not to B. We let the
variable b be x or z, and b¯ the alternative. For a particle
in a σb eigenstate, A declares that, if the committed bit is
a, the particle is a σb eigenstate, while if the committed
bit is a¯, the particle is a σb¯ eigenstate.
As the committed bits in the BCCC protocols were
random, these declarations give B no information about
the bit a. But, since the BCCC protocols ensured that
A would almost certainly have been detected cheating
unless she sent the particles in (nearly) pure σx or σz
eigenstates, this BC protocol does indeed commit her to
a. If she follows the protocol, she can reveal a by giving
B the list of spin states, which he can check by measure-
ments in the appropriate bases. But if she is dishonest,
for one of the two possible commitments, say af , at least
M/2 of declarations are false. Her probability of per-
suading B that the committed bit was af , by producing
for him a list of spin states which pass his tests, is ap-
proximately (1/2)M/2. I.e., for sufficiently large values
of M and the other parameters, B will almost certainly
detect a cheating attempt.
Now, if the BCCC protocols were unconditionally se-
cure, then the ensuing BC protocol is also uncondition-
ally secure. In other words, by combining these pro-
tocols into one, we have an unconditionally secure rel-
ativistic BC protocol with the property that after a fi-
nite number of transmissions the commitment is com-
plete. While unconditionally secure relativistic BC pro-
tocols exist [12,13], these protocols require that transmis-
sions continue indefinitely up to revelation. The same
argument used to establish the NRQBC no-go theorem
[7,10,5,8] shows that no finite unconditionally secure rela-
tivistic BC protocol exists. Hence unconditionally secure
BCCC is impossible.
VI. DISCUSSION
This result re-emphasizes that classical cryptographic
relations cannot naively be transferred into the quantum
realm. In classical cryptology, non-relativistic or rela-
tivistic, there is no distinction between BC and BCCC: in
quantum relativistic cryptology, BC can be implemented
with unconditional security, while BCCC cannot.
A less direct argument for the impossibility of un-
conditionally secure BCCC follows from results of Yao
[14], which imply that unconditionally secure oblivious
transfer (OT) could be built from unconditionally secure
BCCC. Since non-relativistic BC can straightforwardly
be constructed from OT, we again reach a contradiction
with the NRQBC no-go theorem.
Note, finally, that while unconditionally secure BCCC
is impossible, BCCC schemes with security based on
computational assumptions are certainly possible. Most
standard classical BC schemes that are perfectly secure
against A — for example, those based on factorisation
or obtaining a discrete logarithm — have this property.
An interesting recent quantum BC proposal by Salvail
[15] also has this property. It would be very interesting
to understand whether BCCC schemes can be built with
security based on assumptions which can confidently be
relied upon in a future quantum technological era.
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